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ii This paper will provide the background and argument for a change in ISR planning and who should do it. It will also provide one suggested method for how to go about designing and executing an ISR campaign.
Why an ISR Campaign?
The New Security Environment
Since Sept. 11, the U.S. military and intelligence community have played an ever-expanding role in America's response to the new threat environment. The Global War on Terror (GWOT) has already begun to move beyond Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq (e.g., to the Philippines and Horn of Africa). It is not farfetched to think that the military could become involved in uprooting terrorist groups over the coming years in a wide range of countries. 2 If this is the case it is likely that operations in the GWOT will be similar to what the military has become accustomed to over the past decade. Multiple and simultaneous military operations characterized the normal operating mode for the military in the recent past and the same can be expected during the GWOT.
Coming military operations in many countries probably will be characterized by enemies adept at cover, concealment, and deception (both super-empowered individuals and small groups of non-state actors as well as traditional nation states) operating in environments and terrain (urban areas or dense jungle, for example) that stresses conventional military operations and intelligence collection capabilities. The operations probably will be constrained by ever tighter rules of engagement due to international pressure or in mitigation of possible negative publicity. What this target set and environment portends is there will need to be a greater emphasis on ISR functions rather than just on combat or strike functions. The GWOT will depend on globally coordinated and executed ISR operations vice regionally focused ISR operations. The reason is best illustrated by the story of six blind men and an elephant that describes "that how something is perceived determines how an individual understands it and, by implication, that individual's response to it." 3 Seeing only part of the whole picture will often lead someone to form an incomplete idea of what is actually being seen. In other words, the way a person sees a problem often defines the problem. It follows that how you define a problem in turn influences choices about how much time, money, effort, and talent you are willing to invest toward the problem.
The elephant analogy holds true for how we view the world and the international security environment. Often, only looking at part of the problem, or approaching a problem from only a regional perspective, may blind us to the whole picture of how the problem exists in a global environment. The world is a complex adaptive system in which a very large set of variables interact. "With that in mind, the U.S. must shift from a regional to a global view of the international security environment to better understand and respond to its challenges." 4 It is clear that trends in the international security environment are tending towards threats that do not respect traditional boundaries. 5 A global perspective is now necessary to ensure the nation's defense. To enable the GWOT we must have a global perspective, and the best way to achieve that perspective is through ISR operations that are planned and executed as a campaign.
Persistent and pervasive ISR operations will be needed to enable short, focused military or law enforcement action. A greater reliance on these types of ISR operations will place even greater demands on already over-tasked low density/high demand (LDHD) ISR assets such as UAVs, theater and national airborne collection platforms like the EP-3 and Rivet Joint, space based imagery systems, and human agents. It is clear that almost from the very beginning functions or missions that crossed regional boundaries required a focused commander of their own to manage the activity. It is also clear that today's threat environment has increased the chances that problems will cross regional boundaries. "Obviously, terrorist networks today have a global presence, with members and cells around the world, and the U.S. can no longer adequately counter terrorism by relying exclusively on regional strategies. A global, vice regional, approach to the problem is the answer."
8 The newly transformed STRATCOM appears to be the best answer for addressing just this sort of global problem. In recognition of this, it has been assigned some missions that have been unassigned previously and some that overlap the responsibilities of regional combatant commands. STRATCOM's focus has been considerably broadened. It has global responsibilities and it must have a global perspective.
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Although STRATCOM's missions have grown, the missions of regional combatant commands remain unchanged. They are still expected to provide "essential regional expertise; they represent an enduring basis for U.S. presence around the globe; they are the keys to successful theater-security cooperation with allies and friends; and they form the basis for pursuing multinational interoperability and military coalitions. In both peace and war, regional combatant commands give direction to, and exert C2 over, U.S. military activities around the world."
10
The challenge, then, is to balance what the regional commander does and must do with whatever construct is used to address global problems. "Whether combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities are divided along functional lines and addressed on a global basis or whether they continue to be addressed along regional lines, seams, or discontinuities where one command's responsibilities end and another's begin, usually are created." 11 These seams cannot be avoided unless a single organization is placed in charge of everything, everywhere, all the time. Since the seams cannot always be avoided, they often become the vulnerabilities that are exploited. Although great thought was given to the placement of the seams, it is becoming ever clearer that no matter how carefully the seams are placed they often become the scenes of crisis. The seams are perfect places for adversaries to confound and confuse U.S. efforts and interests.
It follows that missions that cross all of the regional boundaries require a global approach in addressing them. Although we cannot put someone in charge of everything,
everywhere, all the time we can, in a sense, put someone in charge of something, everywhere, all the time. The classic example of one such mission is computer-network defense.
"Electrons do not respect geographic boundaries, and requiring each of our geographic commands to plan independently for protecting computer networks would create unacceptable seams. Thus, the lead for computer-network defense was assigned to USSPACECOM in 1999. This assignment of a global mission to a commander with a global perspective was a precursor of the new missions assigned to STRATCOM."
12
Like computer-network defense, there are several other areas that can be best addressed globally vice regionally. These inherently global mission areas "include (1) integration of missile defense across AORs; (2) certain elements of IO; (3) space operations;
(4) global strike operations; (5) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities and (6) counterterrorism."
13
The new nature of the threat facing America demands that the U.S. develop new global capabilities. Depending on the mission, we may see regional combatant commands as either supported or supporting commanders. One aspect that will be prevalent will be the need for a global perspective in planning and execution of global operations. And since many of these global operations cross regional boundaries it is fair to assume that regional combatant commands will more often than not find themselves in a supporting role. "In the future, we are much more likely to see regional commands supporting the new STRATCOM... This change in roles will require our regional combatant commands to develop a deeper appreciation for the global perspective of America's security needs."
14
To enable global operations, the U.S. "will need global ISR activities for gathering indications and warning data and for otherwise enabling global strike, space operations, certain elements of IO, and integrated missile defense. Moreover, global C2 capabilities and the knowledge to enable and integrate regional operations with global operations, as well as integrating regional operations in one AOR with those of another is necessary." 15 Global ISR needs to be much more than ISR conducted across several regions with the collected information combined and analyzed in some attempt at divining the big picture.
"Knitting together various regionally focused ISR activities is unlikely to yield a coherent global perspective. Simply put, we cannot obtain a relevant global perspective without ISR activities that, to some degree, are globally coordinated and directed-a function [currently] performed by the Defense Intelligence Agency. The new factor is that, given the LDHD nature of many of our ISR resources, regional combatant commands are more likely than before to be required to conduct ISR activities in support of global operations tasked to USSOCOM or STRATCOM." 16 Furthermore, the Unified Command Plan 02, Change 2, assigns STRATCOM the responsibility for "planning, integrating and coordinating intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) in support of strategic and global operations, as directed." In addition to developing these ISR campaign plans, it further assigns responsibility for "tasking and coordinating C 4 ISR capabilities in support of strategic force employment, to include global strike, missile defense and the associated planning." 17 It is for all of these aforementioned reasons that STRATCOM must develop and implement a global ISR campaign similar in nature and scope to other combatant commander's campaign plans.
Campaign Definitions

Definition and Purpose of Campaigns
According to joint doctrine, a campaign plan is "a plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space." 18 In short, a campaign is the tool that integrates, sequences, and synchronizes operations together at the operational level of war to achieve some objective. It accomplishes this by translating broad strategic guidance into operational direction for Some might argue that there can be no such thing as an ISR campaign because ISR is a subset of operational intelligence, which itself is simply an operational function. This, however, is not the case because an ISR campaign will not just perform the function associated with operational intelligence (i.e. supporting planning, preparation, and execution of major operations or campaigns) but instead will actually use forces and operational functions to achieve a strategic ISR-related objective. An operational commander will plan and execute an ISR campaign by sequencing and synchronizing ISR assets and operations.
The operational functions enumerated above will be used to support the ISR operations that, when linked together in time and space, result in an ISR campaign. For example, operational intelligence will be required to provide guidance and background for when and where the ISR operations will take place. It will also provide feedback as to the effects of the ISR operations. The operational function of C2 will be employed by the commander as he sequences and synchronizes the activity of all necessary ISR elements in the campaign. The right C2 should also provide the necessary unity of effort and command for success as well as spelling out the responsibilities of each discrete command echelon in the campaign. An ISR campaign dependent on LDHD assets will obviously rely heavily on operational logistics to ensure that the right forces, materiel, and support are in the right places at the right time.
Although the list could continue for how each operational function will be used to support the ISR campaign, the aforementioned ones should be enough for illustrative purposes. It should now be clear that an ISR campaign will be more than just the operational function of intelligence.
Why ISR Campaign Planning Will be Different
ISR Campaign Defined
A global ISR campaign will therefore be a campaign in the truest sense of the word.
The term campaign is often misapplied to what are essentially discrete major operations.
This error is most often the result of a semantic misunderstanding by those who are describing the action. For example, many military commanders described previous major military actions like Operation Desert Storm, Operation Noble Anvil, and Operation Iraqi
Freedom as campaigns when in fact it can be convincingly argued that these were major operations. They do not fit the traditional definition of a campaign but rather were a series of battles and engagements that in total formed an operation. Thus, a global ISR campaign, to qualify as a campaign and to reap the benefits of campaign planning, must be more than a series of unconnected collection activities aimed only at answering stated intelligence requirements.
There are many benefits to be reaped from an ISR campaign. The first is sequenced and synchronized ISR operations. ISR operations conceived, planned and executed from cradle to grave as a specific campaign rather than concocted as an afterthought in support of another operation could produce superior results. A campaign would provide broad concepts of operations in support of objectives, order expected decisions to be made into schedules for decision makers, aid in achieving unity of effort, organize subordinate forces, establish command relationships, serve as a basis for other plans, and define success. An ISR campaign will be proactive vice reactive and help retain friendly freedom of action in scheduling the deployment and employment of LDHD ISR assets.
Campaign plans involve sequencing and synchronizing multiple operations across greater time and space domains, which means that such plans look well into the future. This in turn should allow greater fidelity and granularity in the scheduling of LDHD ISR assets and the associated training and maintenance that goes with them as well as acting as a guide for future procurement efforts. This will help ease OPTEMPO and prevent early fatigue of scarce resources. "The anticipated demand for future resources" detailed in a campaign plan "serves to alert higher authorities, i.e. the national leadership or the combined and joint staffs, of the current and future national preparations that will be necessary." 24 In the absence of combat operations and execution of regional commander's Operation Plans (OPLANS), the global ISR campaign will fill a critical role. STRATCOM, acting as a supported commander and using operational artistry, will develop and execute a global campaign plan that integrates, synchronizes, and sequences ISR operations to optimize the desired effect and achieve strategic objectives. The assignment of a supported commander role to STRATCOM and the debate such a role will engender deserves to be addressed here.
Inevitably, someone will make the claim that functional combatant commands should always support regional combatant commands. Implied, if not stated, is the belief that conducting operations or executing missions is the sole purview of regional combatant commands and that no functional combatant command should conduct operations in a regional combatant commander's AOR. Such hard-and-fast rules have never existed, and supported-supporting relationships continue to depend on the situation and mission objectives. That is why supported-supporting relationships are spelled out in planning orders, deployment orders, execution orders, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, OPLANS, and concept plans. 25 Spelling out STRATCOM's lead in the supported role for the development and execution of a global ISR campaign makes the most sense. If the top decision makers in Washington maintain a global perspective then so must those who support them.
STRATCOM will plan and conduct the global ISR campaign to help all the combatant commanders gain and maintain a global perspective. "If we attempt to do otherwise, we will surely end up like the six blind men in their first encounter with an elephant, endlessly disputing the nature of something we fail to perceive fully. By shifting our view from a regional to a global perspective, we will better comprehend and respond to America's security needs in the twenty-first century". 26 A global ISR campaign and its associated operations will be planned and executed for a global theater. Regional commanders will support the operations as defined in the campaign plan and sometimes will be supported by the campaign. These functional commands will be able to execute their assigned tasks within the AORs of regional commanders, who may be required to support the functional commanders' requirements in an almost total role reversal of conventionally thought of roles of support. The regional command's support to the functional commander conducting a global mission could include personnel, logistics and intra-theater transportation.
In executing the operations of the campaign, ISR assets could remain under the operational control (OPCON) of regional commanders or control could be retained by STRATCOM. In the case where OPCON rests with the regional commander, liaison by STRATCOM planners in the campaign development phase should ensure that ISR activity will continue to fulfill both regional and global requirements. As an example, one aspect of the global ISR campaign may be to gather general military intelligence and provide Indications and Warning on a specific targeted organization. Operations fulfilling this requirement could also fulfill standing intelligence requirements of a regional commander and in the case of transnational problems may satisfy even more than one regional commander.
Finally, STRATCOM must ensure that an appropriate C2 organization is created to match the regional commander's requirements within the bigger picture of the global ISR campaign. The supporting commanders must synchronize their own ISR plans and operations with the global ISR campaign. STRATCOM then will provide the necessary centralized direction while in some cases allowing the regional commanders to conduct decentralized execution.
Operationalizing the Strategy
New Operating Patterns and Concepts
New plans and new capabilities demand new operating patterns and concepts for execution and employment. In the simplest terms, an ISR campaign will consist of STRATCOM acting as the supported commander to do the following: Synchronize ISR operations in time and space with regard to the ISR forces available. STRATCOM will do this without regard to regional combatant commander geographic boundaries. This will ensure continuity on target whenever and wherever it crosses seams. It also eliminates the "rob Peter to pay Paul" scenario often endemic to operations requiring LDHD assets. In essence, a global ISR campaign will ensure that competition for resources is managed so no one commander can "steal" or monopolize a needed platform or capability. This overarching management will be possible since an ISR campaign will project and plan for future operations even as current operations are executed. Appendix A offers one suggested example of how an ISR campaign plan could be structured.
Under the current system the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) acts as the central clearing house to deconflict and schedule assets to fill collection requirements. DIA's Defense Collection Group "levies intelligence requirements on collection agencies and resources, monitors, collection responses, and evaluates collections efforts in terms of reliability, efficiency, and cost." 27 What DIA does not do, though, is provide any type of objective-oriented direction to the collection effort. It simply evaluates and weighs requests for collections and assigns assets to fulfill the requirements. It does this without regard to how the intelligence information derived from separate requirements may be related.
Without a central, coordinated campaign that synchronizes all of this, we will continue to have combatant commands competing for scarce ISR resources and replicating ISR functions. Currently, the system provides a regionally focused perspective through disjointed, discrete ISR operations instead of getting the synergistic effect desired and achievable with a global ISR campaign.
By placing liaison officers at other combatant commands, STRATCOM will drive ISR discipline and preparation by integrating core ISR capabilities into each of the other commander's deliberate and crisis planning early in the process. These liaison officers will have visibility into the global ISR campaign and will understand how the other OPLANS will be affected if executed. It will help avoid the crisis reaction of over allocating scarce ISR assets to a theater without a well thought out employment plan or understanding of how other aspects of the ISR campaign will be affected.
Additionally, STRATCOM can develop standing ISR packages tailored to specific OPLANS so that when executed the OPLANS will have minimal impact on the rest of the world and the global ISR campaign can continue to be executed.
Conclusion
So what is the purpose and real value-added of a global ISR campaign? The answer is the campaign will provide a holistic view of the world that is essential to dealing with transnational threats. The holistic view will overcome the seams and broken coverage that occurs between regional commands. It will help reduce complexity by providing unity of effort through centralized direction and decentralized execution while growing and retaining common doctrine and corporate knowledge for ISR operations. 3 Myers recounts the following "ancient Oriental story. In ancient India, six blind men encountered an elephant for the first time and quickly began to squabble about the nature of elephants. The first blind man bumped into the elephant's side and declared that the beast was like a wall. The second, discovering the ear, concluded it was like a fan. The third blind man came across the tail and thought the elephant to be very much like a rope. The fourth, encountering the elephant's leg, was sure the animal resembled a tree. Finding the tusk, the fifth blind man proclaimed the elephant to be like a spear. And the sixth, grasping the elephants' trunk, concluded the giant pachyderm most resembled a snake." General Richard B. Myers, "A Word from the Chairman-Shift to a Global Perspective," Air and Space Power Journal, (Fall 2003) , 5. 4 Myers, 5. 5 Myers, 8. 6 Harshberger, 2.
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11 Myers, 8. 12 Myers, 8 . 13 Myers also states that "Missile defense is a responsibility of all of our regional combatant commands. However, no such command, including the newly established USNORTHCOM, is more suited than any other to integrate missile defense operations across AORs in support of the president's stated goal of providing protection for deployed US forces, allies, and friends. When missiles in a distant theater can be used against targets anywhere on the globe, the United States needs global ISR and global C2 to integrate its missile defense capabilities, which, by the way, include offensive capabilities to preempt or prevent missile attacks. We cannot afford to think of missile defense merely in terms of actively intercepting missiles after launch. Similarly, certain elements of IO require a global perspective and better integration of our nation's capabilities. Although IO should become a core war-fighting capability of all our combatant commands, certain IO activities could create effects of such magnitude that focusing on regional consequences would become unnecessarily restrictive and ultimately unhelpful. Even when the effects of IO are limited to a single AOR, we will need a global perspective to ensure that theater IO is compatible with IO in other AORs. A global perspective will often provide the essential starting point for success, whether we are attempting to get a message across to an audience that spans more than one theater, conducting electronic warfare (EW) activities to inhibit longdistance communications, performing computer-network operations, or carrying out military-deception programs. Even within a single theater, STRATCOM will add value to the regional combatant commands by integrating efforts previously stovepiped in different organizations (e.g., C2 warfare, psychological operations [PSYOP] , EW, and computer network attack [CNA] ). Space operations present another military-mission area requiring a global perspective rather than a regional focus. Given the vital role space operations play in global communications, one cannot always determine precisely where space operations end and IO begins. In the past, the supported-supporting relationships between regional combatant commands and USSPACECOM were predominantly one way, with the latter supporting the regional commands. " Myers, [8] [9] 
